The Gibraltar crisis and the measures, options and strategies open to Spain by Valle Gálvez, Alejandro del

135
Cuadernos de Gibraltar – Gibraltar Reports
Número 1/Issue # 1, enero-diciembre/January-December 2015, pp. 135-147
THE GIBRALTAR CRISIS AND THE MEASURES, 
OPTIONS AND STRATEGIES OPEN TO SPAIN
AlejAndro del VAlle GálVez1
I. THE CURRENT NEGOTIATING DEADLOCK AND CRISIS – II. SPAIN’S STRATEGIC 
OPTIONS – III. THE MEASURES PROPOSED BY SPAIN IN AUGUST 2013 – IV. DOES 
SPAIN REALLY WANT TO REGAIN GIBRALTAR? – V. CONCLUSION.
The diplomatic crisis that broke out in July and August of  2013 between Spain and the UK 
due to the dispute of  fishing rights and environmental protection in the waters surrounding 
the Rock has prompted the announcement by the Spanish government of  a parcel of  
measures to be taken against Gibraltar. The escalation with the UK has led to protests over 
more stringent controls at the frontier and to the firmly expressed British support for the 
Gibraltarian authorities, coinciding with the arrival of  several Royal Navy ships en route to an 
exercise in the Mediterranean.
This paper looks at a number of  issues concerning the validity of  some of  the Spanish 
government’s measures and with Spain’s current strategy in relation to this historical 
controversy. It first analyses the context in which the measures are to be adopted in order to 
subsequently consider them in light of  the strategic options open to Spain in its dispute over 
Gibraltar.
I. THE CURRENT NEGOTIATING DEADLOCK AND CRISIS
The point of  departure is the historically very worrying deadlock on Gibraltar, since there 
are at present no valid means of  dialogue on the controversy between the UK and Spain, or for 
including Gibraltar in cross-border cooperation talks. With the change in both governments 
in 2010-11, the institutional channels were formally blocked in 2012: the Trilateral Dialogue 
Forum was deactivated when Spain demanded its conversion into a four-sided entity and the 
UK rejected changing what was agreed bilaterally in October 2004.2 Additionally, in 2012 
1 Professor of  Public International Law, Jean Monnet Chair of  EU Law, University of  Cádiz. Trabajo publicado 
como Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano, ARI 32/2013 (Translated from Spanish), 30.09.2013 (http://www.
realinstitutoelcano.org/) y realizado en el marco del Proyecto de Investigación de I+D “Cuestiones territoriales y 
Cooperación transfronteriza en el Área del Estrecho”, DER2012-34577 (subprograma JURI) del Plan Nacional de 
I+D+i 2013-2015, financiado por el Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad y los fondos FEDER de la UE (IP: 
Dr. A. del Valle Gálvez).
2 See the analysis by Alejandro del Valle Gálvez (2012), “Gibraltar, de foro tripartito a cuatripartito: entre la 
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the UK again opposed reactivating the bilateral Brussels Process of  1984, since it demanded 
Gibraltar’s acquiescence for doing so.
The absence of  dialogue has led to many incidents in the Bay of  Gibraltar –or Algeciras, 
as it is known in Spanish– related to the Spanish fishing fleet and to the presence in the 
waters surrounding the Rock –British Gibraltar Territorial Waters– of  vessels of  the Royal 
Navy, the Spanish Navy, the Civil Guard and the Royal Gibraltar Police. Especially during 
2012 and 2013, Gibraltar suspended the application of  the informal agreement of  1999 with 
the Spanish fishermen’s guilds3 –the previous official accord, signed in 1998 by the Foreign 
Minister Abel Matutes and the Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, was never put into practice–,4 
cooperación transfronteriza y la soberanía”, ARI nr 21/2012, Elcano Royal Institute, 23/III/2012, < http://www.
realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/
zonas_es/europa/ari21-2012 >.
3 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmfaff/366/9042006.htm>.
4 <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk./pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmfaff/366/9042004.htm>.
FIGURE 1. Site of  Community Importance (SCI) in the waters surrounding the Rock
The area in blue is known as the Southern Waters of  Gibraltar, recognised in 2006 as a Site of  
Community Importance (SCI) by the European Commission. The British SCI does not cover the 
entirety of  the British Gibraltar Territorial Waters.
Source: Gibraltar Nature News, nr 112 12, 2006; I. González GArcíA & A. del VAlle GálVez (Eds.), 
Gibraltar y el foro tripartito de diálogo, Ed. Dykinson, Madrid, 2009, p. 541.
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invoking environmental reasons and leading to the banning and cessation of  fishing –with 
subsequent meetings and reports– and then to Gibraltar’s unilateral decision to create an 
artificial reef  with 70 blocks of  concrete in July 2013, which in practice put paid to continuing 
any fishing activities in the area. The underlying issue was clearly the jurisdiction over the 
waters and their environmental protection, with two partially overlapping Sites of  Community 
Importance –one British and another Spanish– (see Figure 1 and 2).
At first the Spanish government requested the continuation of  the informal accord of  
1999, but it has now adopted a number of  measures in view of  the fait accompli of  the fishing 
ban. Since it is important to bear in mind the Government’s political objectives, it is necessary 
to look at the measures adopted from a general perspective to identify the specific object they 
are pursuing and to consider them in the context of  Spain’s realistic options in the Gibraltar 
controversy.
FIGURE 2. Special Conservation Zone (Zona Especial de Conservación or ZEC) in the 
waters surrounding the Rock
Royal Decree 1620/2012, of  30 November, declared the Site of  Community Importance ES6 
12032 Estrecho Oriental of  the Red Natura 2000’s Mediterranean biogeographical region a Special 
Conservation Zone (Zona Especial de Conservación or ZEC), approving the relevant conservation 
regulations.
Source: BOE, nr 289, de 1/XII/2012; I. González GArcíA & M. AcostA sánchez, “La difícil aplicación 
de la estrategia marina europea y la protección del medio marino en la Bahía de Algeciras/Gibraltar”, 
Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales, nr 25, 2013.
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II. SPAIN’S STRATEGIC OPTIONS
It is usually said that Spain’s strategy on Gibraltar has been erratic and there have certainly 
been significant non-consensual jumps in focus depending on each government in office –for 
instance, both in the creation and suppression of  the Tripartie Trilateral Dialogue Forum–. 
Nevertheless, democratic Spain has been constant on a certain number of  issues, such as 
the rapprochement with the Gibraltarians and negotiating with the UK under the UN’s 
decolonisation mandate. But even these policies are now being questioned or are showing 
signs of  exhaustion.
In such a scenario, what are Spain’s options? In the current position, its range of  strategic 
possibilities are actually very limited5:
(1) Reactivating the Brussels Process and the Dialogue Forum, or establishing some 
other negotiating format. The UN’s mandate to negotiate decolonisation had, in the first 
decade of  the 21st century, been reasonably managed by Spain with the blessings of  the 
General Assembly: bilateral negotiations on sovereignty via the Brussels Process, the Trilateral 
Dialogue Forum for cross-border cooperation (with purely local affairs dealt with by the 
joint committee of  Gibraltar and the Spanish municipalities in the Gibraltar area –Comisión 
Mixta Gibraltar-Mancomunidad de Municipios–). Nevertheless, both channels are currently 
blocked, because the UK is opposed to restarting the Brussels Process while Spain refuses 
to take part in the Dialogue Forum. Furthermore, the UN’s demand for decolonisation is 
currently rejected by the UK. Not only do the British and Gibraltarian narratives disregard the 
fact that the internationally accepted status of  Gibraltar is that of  a non-autonomous territory 
–one of  the few that are still pending decolonisation and about which year after year the UN 
insists that self-determination requires negotiations between the UK and Spain in order to 
restore the latter’s territorial integrity– but they specifically consider such a doctrine obsolete 
and inapplicable since the people of  Gibraltar already decided on their self-determination 
when they drafted the 1966  with the 2006 Constitution.
(2) The judicial option. Resorting to a court of  law –essentially the International Court of  
Justice at The Hague (ICJ)– is highly unlikely, since the ICJ cannot automatically deal with 
a case such as this, which would require a specific Spanish-British agreement. Furthermore, 
it is extremely risky for Spain as the best-case scenario of  a ruling in its favour would not 
5 See, for instance, Alejandro del VAlle GálVez (2013), “España y la cuestión de Gibraltar a los 300 años del Tratado 
de Utrecht”, ARI nr 23/2013, Elcano Royal Institute, 20/VI/2013, <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/
portal/rielcano/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/ari23-2013-gonzalez-
galvez-espana-gibraltar-300-anos-tratado-utrecht>.
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resolve the controversy –but only reinforces Spain’s negotiating position–, while a worst-
case scenario of  a ruling against it would be catastrophic for the position it has maintained 
with UN support over the past 50 years, giving legal and practical cover to a new European 
micro-State under British protection and under the Union Jack. In any case, seeking British 
agreement to submitting the case to the ICJ remains a possibility –although unlikely– but 
would require a very broad consensus as it would leave Spain’s centuries-old claim in the hands 
of  an international tribunal.
(3) An imaginative negotiation for an ad hoc solution for Gibraltar. Under the Brussels 
Process or otherwise, a tailor-made solution seeking a permanent and stable international 
status for Gibraltar is a good option for Spain, although it requires reconciling three very 
different but vital interests: the UK’s military needs, Gibraltarian approval and the recovery in 
whatever form of  Spanish sovereignty. But there could be a distinctive formula for the unique 
Gibraltarian case: a model inspired by Andorra or Monaco or the status of  an international 
city associated to the EU and closely linked to the surrounding Spanish municipalities. This 
option is likely to be the one to provide the best results for Spain’s desire for a definitive 
solution, despite the significant internal (nationalist independence movements) and external 
(the permanent Moroccan claims over Ceuta and Melilla) risks, which would therefore require 
a broadly-based and historical national consensus.
(4) A low-profile reclamation based on UN doctrine and the restrictive application of  
the Treaty of  Utrecht. This is the traditional option of  hindering life in Gibraltar, seeking all 
ways of  limiting its advantages and preventing it from abusing its privileged position. It is not 
a solution but a way of  exerting pressure on the UK and Gibraltar with a view to engaging 
in negotiations and reaching accords, although in the absence of  any format or conduit for 
dialogue (as at present) can only lead to a greater deadlock and the risk of  escalation. Conflicts 
have been especially acute since 2009 as regards the maritime areas around the Rock, since 
there has been no desire to reach a modus vivendi or a practical agreement to exert provisional 
jurisdictional authority in Gibraltar’s waters.
III. THE MEASURES PROPOSED BY SPAIN IN AUGUST 2013
An initial problem when considering the Spanish government’s measures is that they 
have merely been announced in the media but not officially adopted. They are in accordance 
with the traditional option (nr 4) of  limiting illegal or abusive action by Gibraltar. They are 
coutermeasures or retaliatory measures whose aim is to return to the statu quo ante in terms 
of  fishing rights and environmental regulation, and that were announced in reaction to the 
140
Cuadernos de Gibraltar – Gibraltar Reports
Número 1/Issue # 1, enero-diciembre/January-December 2015, pp. 135-147
The Gibraltar Crisis and the Measures, Options and Strategies Open to Spain
sinking of  concrete blocks by Gibraltar in Spain’s traditional fishing grounds.
Specifically, the media declarations of  Spain’s Minister of  Foreign Affairs and Prime 
Minister and newspaper reports6 suggest that the following measures are being considered:
• Filing a complaint on the dumping of  concrete blocks before the environmental 
Prosecutor and the European Commission.7
• Implementing a plan against tax fraud and specifically inspecting the 6,700 Gibraltarians 
resident in Spain.
• Reinforcing inspections at the frontier in order to prevent smuggling, money laundering 
and illicit trafficking.
• Modifying the gaming laws in order to ensure that Spanish servers are used by Internet 
gaming companies and online casinos in Gibraltar.
• Annulling certain accords signed under the Trilateral Forum, particularly the Córdoba 
Declaration8 relative to air traffic, closing Spanish airspace and restricting flights from Gibraltar.
• Preventing the entry to Gibraltar of  concrete and other construction materials.
• Studying the possibility of  establishing a €50 levy on entry and exit from Gibraltar, to be 
redistributed to the fishermen affected by the prohibition to operate in their traditional fishing 
grounds.
• In this context, measures have also been announced to counter the bunkering business in 
the waters around the Rock, which are largely part of  the Spanish Special Conservation Zone 
(Zona Especial de Conservación or ZEC) as established by Royal Decree 1620/2012 of  30 
November, which declared as a ZEC the Site of  Community Importance Estrecho Oriental9 
(see Figure 2).
Similarly, procedures have been initiated to implement an order from the Ministry of  
Agriculture to subsidise the fishing fleet in Algeciras and La Línea.10
Along with this, and directly related to the Spanish reaction, controls have been reinforced 
6 Interview with Foreign Minister García-Margallo in ABC, 5/VIII/2013, <http://www.abc.es/espana/20130804/
abci-garcia-margallo-entrevista-201308032026.html>, <http://www.abc.es/espana/20130803/abci-freno-provoca 
ciones-gibraltar-201308031313.html>, and declarations of  the Spanish Prime Minister, 9/VIII/2013, <http://
www.lamoncloa.gob.es/Presidente/Actividades/ActividadesNacionales/2013/090813RajoyMallorca.htm>.
7 <http://www.europasur.es/article/gibraltar/1575200/espana/protesta/ante/la/ue/por/lanzamiento/hormigon 
/mar.html>.
8 Alejandro del VAlle GálVez (2006), “Los acuerdos del Foro de Dialogo sobre Gibraltar: la apuesta 
por la normalización”, ARI nr 107/2006, Elcano Royal Institute, <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/
analisis/1060/1060_ValleGalvez_Gibraltar.pdf>.
9 <http://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2012-14698>.
10 <http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/ServiciosdePrensa/NotasPrensa/MinisterioAgriculturaAlimentacionMedio 
Ambiente/2013/120813AyudasPesca.htm>.
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at the frontier as an external European border. This prompted a conversation between David 
Cameron and Mariano Rajoy11, followed by a talk between the Minister of  Foreign Affairs 
and the Foreign Secretary who agreed, according to Spain, on the creation of  ad hoc working 
groups.12 For its part, the UK announced that it would study initiating unprecedented measures 
against the border controls.13
As for the frontier, although it is not considered as such by Spain, it does view it as a 
border crossing where individuals and merchandises are checked. There is a presumption 
in favour of  the lawfulness of  Spain’s action, since it is a European external land border of  
the Schengen area, to which the UK does not belong, while Gibraltar is furthermore not a 
member of  the customs union. Hence, the burden of  proof  is on the party claiming that an 
illegality has occurred. Naturally, everyone in the area knows from years ago that political 
crises have an immediate effect on how slow the border crossing is. Nevertheless, the problem 
of  traffic congestion at the Gibraltar border has already been the subject in previous years 
of  many complaints to the Commission, none of  which has been submitted to the Court 
of  Justice of  the European Union. Of  course, the delays exasperate both the Gibraltarians 
and the other inhabitants of  the area and create a sense of  vulnerability in Gibraltar, so it 
is no surprise that the checks –described as ‘inhuman’– will be brought before the relevant 
international bodies. Despite the strong presumption of  legality in favour of  Spain, since the 
checks are in conformity with the Schengen Border Code14 (with Spain claiming they are in 
accordance with the principles of  randomness, proportionality and non-discrimination), the 
extraordinary increase in the delays and their synchrony with the parcel of  measures adopted 
against Gibraltar can detract from any claim to objectivity for the border checks imposed since 
the crisis broke out.
On the other hand, there is a strong presumption against the legality of  the proposed €50 
levy. In the absence of  a full legal analysis of  both the measure and its justification –since it is 
Spain’s responsibility to argue its lawfulness–, the border levy does appear to be problematic. 
In principle it cannot rely directly on the restrictions specified in the Treaty of  Utrecht, since 
in my opinion only the first and last paragraphs of  Art. X are clearly in force, so that the 
second paragraph’s limitations on communications are no longer valid and, if  they were, they 
11 <http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/Presidente/Actividades/ActividadesInternacionales/2013/070813rajoycameron 
.htm>.
12 Communiqué 144 of  the Spanish Ministry of  Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, 7/VIII/2013, <http://
www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/SalaDePrensa/Comunicados/Paginas/2013_COMUNICADOS/20130807_
COMUNICADO144.aspx>.
13 <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2013/08/12/espana/1376305796.html>.
14 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32006R0562:ES:HTML>.
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would be contrary to the EU Treaty, which has precedence over earlier treaties. Actually, as a 
border levy or tax, there are several aspects of  the measure that make its application doubtful: 
(a) its motivation due to, or coinciding with, a problem or crisis of  a political nature –in this 
case, the explicit purpose of  directing the amount collected to the fishermen is an admission 
of  its political motivation–; (b) its proportionality is doubtful unless it is directly linked to 
technical external cross-border controls and the ensuing delays and problems; (c) it is very 
likely that a €50 levy for entry plus another €50 exit tax –€100 for crossing a frontier in a 
country where the minimum wage is €645– will have a deterrent effect on the free movement 
of  persons and citizens in the EU; and (d), finally, a similar ‘decongestion’ levy (of  €5 per 
vehicle) adopted in 2010 by the authorities of  La Línea de la Concepción was already declared 
illegal by the Attorney General and suspended by a court in Algeciras.
But, regardless of  this controversial prospective levy, the main drawback of  these measures 
is that they do not seek the resolve the controversy –like all those adopted under category (4) 
above, aimed at restricting Gibraltarian abuses– and, because they are divorced from Spain’s 
main vindicatory arsenal –the UN doctrine on decolonisation– can easily be denounced as 
mere political retaliation. Certainly, the immediate objective is clearly to make a show of  force 
and not accept Gibraltar’s encroachments on Spain’s rights, in addition to highlighting the 
former’s vulnerability and dependence on the latter –as has been abundantly made clear–. The 
objective of  returning to the previous situation as regards fishing rights, before the unilateral 
sinking of  concrete blocks by Gibraltar, also reaffirms Spanish sovereignty over the disputed 
waters.
Nevertheless, some of  the measures announced, such as revising or nullifying the soft law 
agreements adopted by the Trilateral Forum are a radical break in seeking a rapprochement 
with the Gibraltarian population, which has been the traditional approach adopted by Spain 
since the transition to democracy.
There is a further immediate objective, or negotiating strategy, involving cross-border 
cooperation, which focuses on somehow achieving one of  the initial goals on the government 
of  Mariano Rajoy regarding Gibraltar: instate a four-sided dialogue. The idea of  creating four-
sided ad hoc groups –which, according to the media, was accepted in writing by the Foreign 
Secretary, William Hague, on 14 April 2012, although the Foreign Office actually referred to 
exploring an ad hoc dialogue that includes Gibraltar–15 could in itself  justify the Spanish plan 
if  a permanent four-sided channel of  communication is established. Nevertheless, the idea of  
15 FCO Press Release, 7/VIII/2013, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-calls-spanish-
foreign-minister-garcia-margallo>.
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creating four-sided working groups would appear to be subject to limitations and in the best 
of  cases –assuming the Gibraltarian government accepts, when it has already announced its 
rejection–16 will simply allow the Junta de Andalucía and the Mancomunidad de Municipios 
del Campo de Gibraltar to participate on an equal footing with Gibraltar, Spain and the UK 
to deal with specific issues. In any case, both the Junta and the Mancomunidad were already 
permanently integrated the dialogue forum –in the Joint Commission coordinated by the 
forum–. The gain would therefore be achieving in a different way the conversion of  the 
Trilateral Dialogue Forum into a four-sided concern, as the government wanted as a matter of  
principle in January 2012, although under a new format (a new ‘local cooperation mechanism’, 
as reflected by the different focus expressed in the latest decision about Gibraltar adopted by 
the UN General Assembly on 18 December 2012).17
Of  course, if  Spain manages to establish four-sided working groups or a local cooperation 
mechanism this in itself  would be an achievement and would at least allow it to enjoy an 
institutional channel for debate, negotiation and the adoption of  agreements. Having some 
sort of  structure, even if  only for cross-border cooperation –without which diplomatic crises 
are inevitable– has proved to be vital, even if  less effective than the Trilateral Forum: the latter 
is currently ruled out mainly because it gives symbolical recognition to Gibraltar as a direct 
and equal partner on cross-border issues. Nonetheless, the Forum did provide a permanent 
format with pre-established formulas and an open agenda to deal on a daily basis with both 
the British and the Gibraltarians and to negotiate and agree with them on affairs relating 
directly or indirectly to Gibraltar.
In summary, the parcel of  measures announced by Spain could help it achieve a number 
of  political objectives, showing firmness before Gibraltar’s unilateral acts and, in the best of  
cases, the ad hoc four-sided working groups on fishing and the environment would serve 
as channels for cross-border dialogue. However, these goals do not seek the resolution of  
the dispute and call into question the policy of  normalising relations with the Gibraltarian 
population that has been pursued by Spain since the democratic transition. Meanwhile, the 
UK remains at a remove from any direct confrontation, thereby maintain the status quo. 
Certain measures, if  adopted –such as the border congestion levy– could have unwanted legal 
or political consequences.
Nonetheless, it has subsequently emerged that there has been a complete change of  
perspective, with Spain’s parcel of  measures being complemented by other options and 
16 Gibraltar Press Release 585/2013, 7/VIII/2013, <https://www.gibraltar.gov.gi/images/stories/PDF/
pressoffice/pressreleases/2013/585-2013.pdf>.
17 <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N12/542/89/PDF/N1254289.pdf?OpenElement>.
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strategies planned for Gibraltar.18 Apparently, the idea, pending confirmation, is to engage in 
a general strategic offensive to take the Gibraltar issue to international forums such as the EU 
and the UN –at both the General Assembly and the Security Council–. Specifically, there is a 
plan to present a non-consensus draft resolution on Gibraltar to be voted on in the General 
Assembly, associating the Gibraltar issue with the Argentine claim on the Falkland Islands, 
joining in a common cause with Argentina to submit the matter to the Security Council. A 
further consideration is to present a case before an international tribunal.
Should the strategic plan be confirmed, then the parcel of  border measures proposed in 
August might have to be viewed differently, as a circumstantial show of  force within a general 
strategy that combines all of  Spain’s real options, as explained above.
IV. DOES SPAIN REALLY WANT TO REGAIN GIBRALTAR?
Spain’s current government has on several occasions expressed its claim to Gibraltar, at 
different times during its term in office. If  in January 2012 its formal request to London was 
to reactivate the bilateral Brussels Process and reconvert the Dialogue Forum in a four-sided 
forum with the Mancomunidad de Municipios del Campo –although it has been rejected by the 
UK–, in 2013 there has been a whole array of  measures in response to Gibraltar’s unilateral 
action, which at first had appeared to be limited to returning to the fishing agreement of  
1999 and substituting the Forum by a local cooperation mechanism, establishing new four-
sided ad hoc working groups that include the Junta de Andalucía. But in the wake of  the fishing 
and environmental crisis, Spain subsequently engaged in an all-out offensive whose aim is to 
take the Gibraltar case and decolonisation to international forums, with a final recourse to 
international tribunals. Spain’s action has emerged piecemeal, as events unfolded, so that no 
global strategy has yet been released in a fully detailed fashion. This perhaps explains why in 
the international media the question of  Gibraltar has been considered merely an excuse to 
cover up the political crisis and corruption scandals rocking the domestic scene.
If  the Spanish government has really decided to embark on a wide-ranging international 
offensive to regain sovereignty over Gibraltar, it would be convenient to consider the following 
issues before engaging in an all-out struggle:
• First, and although it might seem obvious, it must be accepted that ‘regaining’ Gibraltar 
means ‘negotiating’ a solution sooner or later with the UK; similarly, at some point, 
sooner or later, it must be accepted that it will be necessary –ex ante, during or ex post– to 
18 El País, 11/VIII/2013, <http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2013/08/10/actualidad/1376162592_175442.
html>.
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negotiate with or count on the approval of  the Gibraltarian government, whether after an 
agreement in the framework of  the UN or following a ruling from an international court. 
This requires determining whether there is actually a genuine desire to regain Gibraltar 
whatever the consequences involved, based on a national consensus, the necessary constancy 
and the commitment to maintaining Spain’s traditional lines of  action: rapprochement with 
the Gibraltarians and dialogue with the UK under the UN’s decolonisation mandate. It is 
therefore essential to have clear and precise medium and long-term objectives. Is it to re-start 
the Brussels Process? In that case, starting judicial proceedings that may be of  very uncertain 
success is not the same as reinforcing the UN’s decolonisation doctrine –which year after 
year has supported Spain since 1964– in order to force the UK to re-open bilateral talks. 
And, should this be the objective, what will be the aim of  the conversation? Co-sovereignty? 
Integration into Spain as an autonomous region or province? Or a specific international 
solution for Gibraltar to replace the Treaty of  Utrecht with Gibraltarian approval?
Furthermore, assimilating Gibraltar to the issue of  the Falkland Islands is a political 
expedient that may be justified by the similarity of  the UN decolonisation doctrines involved, 
but its limitations and consequences should be carefully considered. Spain’s judicial position 
is far sounder than Argentina’s as it is based on the Treaty of  Utrecht and is in the framework 
of  the EU and NATO, and on not having resorted to aggression during the period of  the 
UN. But a common front objectively means introducing a third issue and a third State into the 
Gibraltarian equation, which could structurally distort Spain’s position and subject it to legal 
and political eventualities beyond its control.
• Secondly, if  the aim is to regain Gibraltar, then it is important to consider involving the 
Spanish Parliament in the debate on the British military base, which is the main conundrum –or 
one of  the main ones– in the dispute. If  Gibraltar’s population has accepted the risks involved 
in having military facilities, the population in the neighbouring Campo de Gibraltar –and 
even in other parts of  Spain– has not done so. Hence, the deep-seated connivance between 
Spain and the UK regarding the air force, naval and intelligence installations in Gibraltar and 
Spain’s traditional silence on the matter should be subjected to debate in Parliament, since 
the British military bases –surrounded by Spanish waters– have never had Spanish consent 
as regards neither their presence, size, function, risks, emergency situations or evacuation 
plans in the Bay of  Algeciras. The Spanish public must be informed about issues such as 
the docking and repair facilities for nuclear submarines, the type of  British nuclear missiles 
in transit or stopping over in the Bay of  Algeciras, the Royal Air Force’s ammunition depots 
at the airport beside the frontier and the object and services provided by the data, signal 
146
Cuadernos de Gibraltar – Gibraltar Reports
Número 1/Issue # 1, enero-diciembre/January-December 2015, pp. 135-147
The Gibraltar Crisis and the Measures, Options and Strategies Open to Spain
and intelligence installations on the Rock. If  a solution to the dispute is to be found, British 
military and strategic privileges must not be maintained at the expense of  the security of  the 
Spanish public.
• Third, if  a solution to Gibraltar is sought through recourse to a tribunal or by direct 
negotiations with the UK, I believe there are formulas that would make it possible to limit its 
effects on other issues concerning Spain. However, it is highly unlikely for an international 
solution to Gibraltar not to have repercussions on the other side of  the Straits. Of  course, 
Spain’s cities, islands and islets or rocks in Africa have never been considered cases subject to 
decolonisation by the UN and are not on its List of  Non-Self-Governing Territories, in which 
Gibraltar is included. In any case, it must be accepted that a solution for Gibraltar is likely 
to be transposed to a certain degree to the cases of  Ceuta and Melilla, although Moroccan 
foreign policy has not raised the comparison for some decades. But if  a solution is found, it 
will inevitably affect the two cities due to the political and geographical similarities. Whether it 
is thought that a solution for Gibraltar is considered inapplicable to the case or that it might be 
strategically convenient in the long-term to consider the similarities, from the very beginning 
it must be borne in mind that it will be necessary to have an appropriate response and action 
plan ready.
V. CONCLUSION
The crisis with Gibraltar in July-August 2013 as a result of  Spain’s reaction to Gibraltar’s 
unilateral action in disputed waters could be just the prelude to more bitter episodes. The 
parcel of  measures announced by Spain –but not yet confirmed– has certain debatable aspects 
and is underpinned by a policy of  showing firmness and limiting any abuses by Gibraltar. 
Nevertheless, some of  the measures might be counterproductive to the aim of  establishing 
four-sided negotiations of  cross-border issues, since they imply putting an end to a policy of  
rapprochement with the Gibraltarian population. In any case, in the current crisis, Spain and 
the UK are best served by not upsetting their important common interests and by avoiding an 
escalation, reducing tension and even seeking an accord over some form of  dialogue.
The measures announced appear to be part of  a Spanish all-out offensive to take the 
dispute to international forums and tribunals, employing all the strategic options Spain has 
to hand. Despite not yet having further details about the objectives and phases involved 
in Spain’s strategy, it is clear that the difficult starting point must contend with the British 
government’s unequivocal support for Gibraltar and with the deterioration in Spain’s recent 
policies towards the Rock (the population factor –normalising coexistence– and negotiating 
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the UN’s decolonisation mandate with the UK).
Nevertheless, the 2013 crisis could have a highly positive outcome if  it helps to clarify 
Spain’s internal position over Gibraltar and for the country to engage in a wide-ranging debate 
and generate a consensus over the strategic option to be followed over the coming years. 
Spain’s claim to Gibraltar is one of  the country’s identity markers and a matter of  national 
dignity. It is therefore worthwhile to ponder and reflect on the issue which to the Spanish 
mind is a national symbol and much more than just a singular rocky promontory on a bay in 
southern Spain. Spain can, of  course, continue with a low-profile reclamation, with sporadic 
crisis of  a greater or lesser intensity, while running the risk of  an external event (such as 
the UK’s exit from the EU or a change of  tack in the UN’s position on territories pending 
decolonisation, for instance) taking over the initiative and dictating Spain’s policy. But the truth 
is that –with sufficient courage and a real political determination and consensus in Spain– 
viable international solutions can be found to turn around an unhappy historical dispute and 
a serious everyday problem into a splendid opportunity for mutual understanding, economic 
development and permanent cooperation with both the UK and Gibraltar.

